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There are two main pathways to investigate the sense of body ownership, (i) through the
study of the conditions of embodiment for an object to be experienced as one’s own and (ii)
through the analysis of the deﬁcits in patients who experience a body part as alien. Here, I
propose that E is embodied if some properties of E are processed in the same way as the
properties of one’s body. However, one must distinguish among different types of embodi-
ment, and only self-speciﬁc embodiment can lead to feelings of ownership. I address issues
such as the functional role and the dynamics of embodiment, degrees and measures of
ownership, and shared body representations between self and others. I then analyse the
interaction between ownership and disownership. On the one hand, I show that there is
no evidence that in the Rubber Hand Illusion, the rubber hand replaces the biological hand.
On the other hand, I argue that the sense of disownership experienced by patients towards
their body part cannot be reduced to the mere lack of ownership.
 2010 Published by Elsevier Inc.1. Introduction
Our body may be the object we know the best, fromwhich we constantly receive a ﬂow of information from vision, touch,
proprioception, the vestibular and the interoceptive systems. Not only do we receive more information on our body than on
any other objects, but we also have an internal access to it that we have to no other bodies. What makes our body so special
may thus be that unlike other physical objects and other bodies, we perceive it from the inside. Only in our body, or at least
in what we represent as our own body, do we feel bodily sensations. We also care for our body like we care for no other
bodies, let alone other objects. Finally, it seems that it is only our own body that obeys our will with no intermediary.
Yet, the relation between the body and the self is complex, giving rise to vivid philosophical debates (see Table 1).
Some debates have been going on for centuries like questions about the ontological nature of the self and personal iden-
tity or about the epistemological certainty we have that this is our own body with no possible doubt. Other debates have
emerged from recent scientiﬁc progress like issues about the moral and legal status of body parts in a time of research
on biological materials or questions about the sensory and cognitive underpinnings of the sense of body ownership following
a booming of studies in cognitive psychology and neuropsychology these last 10 years.
Here, I shall set the agenda for the investigation of the sense of ownership of body parts.1 I shall focus on two main path-
ways, through the study of embodiment and through the study of disownership (see Table 2). However, the relation between
embodiment, ownership and disownership is too often left unarticulated. In the paper, I shall bring out some of the main lines of
force in this literature and lay the foundation for a proper theory of the sense of ownership. Two questions are of particular
interest. First, are embodiment and ownership a matter of all-or-nothing or does it come in degrees or in various types? Second,
what is the relationship between experiences of ownership and experiences of disownership?y Elsevier Inc.
nal on Brain and Self: Bridging the Gap.
nd ownership of the body as a whole. For such an account, see for instance Blanke and Metzinger (2009).
mont, F. Embodiment, ownership and disownership. Consciousness and Cognition (2010),
Table 1
Sample of issues concerning the body and the self.
Ontological questions Am I a body or do I own a body?
If I own a body, which body is mine?
What grounds personal identity? Memory or the body?
Ethical and legal questions Can one have property rights upon body parts?
If so, who owns the human body?
Does the status of the body vary whether it is the living body,
separated tissues, human ﬂuids or the body after death?
Can the body be commercialized like any object?
Psychological questions Is there a positive phenomenology of ownership?
What grounds the sense of ownership?
What is the functional role of the sense of ownership?
How is the sense of ownership related to (a) bodily sensations, (b)
action, and (c) emotion?
Can one feel ownership towards any object?
Epistemological questions Can bodily self-ascriptions be immune to error through
misidentiﬁcation relative to the subject?
What guarantees bodily immunity to error?
Table 2
Artiﬁcial embodiment and pathological disembodiment.
Embodiment References
Allograft Transplantation of a limb that belonged to another individual e.g., Dubernard et al. (2003), Farnè, Roy, Giraux,
Dubernard, and Sirigu (2002)
Prosthesis Appropriation of prosthetic limbs in amputees e.g., Lotze et al. (1999), Murray (2004)
Virtual avatar Perception and control of a body (or a part of a body) through
virtual reality apparatus
e.g., Cole et al. (2009)
Supernumerary limb Hallucinatory experience of additional limbs e.g., Khateb et al. (2009)
Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) Illusion of ownership of a fake hand induced by the sight of
brushing of a rubber hand at the same time as sensations of
brushing of the person’s own hidden hand
e.g., Botvinick and Cohen (1998), Tsakiris and Haggard
(2005)
Full-body illusion Out-of-the body experience or body swapping induced by
synchronous stroking of one’s body and a virtual body.
e.g., Ehrsson (2007), Lenggenhager et al. (2007), Petkova
and Ehrsson (2009)
Tool Modiﬁcation of the representation of the peripersonal space
and the personal space after tool use
e.g., Cardinali, Frassinetti et al. (2009), Cardinali, Brozzoli
(2009), Farne and Ladavas (2000), Maravita and Iriki
(2004)
Disembodiment
Segmental exclusion
syndrome
Under-utilization of the limb after recovery following the
lack of use of the limb caused by a traumatic or infectious
affection
e.g., Sacks (1984)
Peripheral deafferentation Loss of tactile and proprioceptive information e.g., Cole (1995)
Somatoparaphrenia Denial of ownership of one’s body part e.g., Vallar and Ronchi (2009), Feinberg (2009)
Depersonalization General alteration of the relation to the self: anomalous
bodily experiences, emotional numbing, sensation of
alienation from surroundings and anomalous subjective
recall
e.g., Sierra et al. (2005)
Body Integrity Identity
Disorder (BIID)
Urge to be amputated of one’s own perfectly healthy limb(s) e.g., First (2005), Brang et al. (2008)
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Before investigating the grounds of the sense of body ownership, one must distinguish between feeling of ownership
and judgement of ownership (for a similar distinction within the sense of agency, see Bayne & Pacherie, 2007). Some
philosophers, however, take the sense of ownership to be exclusively judgmental (Bermudez, in press). On the deﬂationary
conception of ownership, there is no such thing as a feeling of body ownership, that is, a positive phenomenology of ‘myness’
that goes beyond the mere experience of bodily properties. We are aware that this body is our own in the sense that we
know it, not in the sense that we feel it. This may be true for some parts of the body, like internal organs. However, as
O’Shaughnessy (1980, p. 211) says: ‘‘While my gall-bladder is a part of me that I know exists, my leg is that and more”. What
is the difference? I believe that my gall-bladder is a part of my body and that it belongs to me. But in the case of my leg, it is
not just something that I believe. It is something that I immediately feel, though it may not be phenomenologically intense.
My leg strikes me as my own in the same way that the color of the ocean strikes me as blue. My body is manifested to me in aPlease cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Embodiment, ownership and disownership. Consciousness and Cognition (2010),
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.004
F. de Vignemont / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2010) xxx–xxx 3more primitive form that beliefs or judgments. It is manifested in the form of feelings of ownership (de Vignemont, 2007).
There is something it is like to experience parts of my body as my own, some kind of non-conceptual intuitive awareness of
ownership.
The recent re-discovery of the Rubber Hand Illusion (hereafter RHI) has opened a new path for the study of the feeling of
body ownership (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Brieﬂy, in the classical set-up, participants sit with their arm resting on a table,
hidden behind a screen. They look at a rubber hand presented in front of them, and the experimenter simultaneously strokes
both the participant’s hand and the fake hand. Participants report feeling as if they were touched on the rubber hand and as if
the rubber hand were part of their body. Thanks to the RHI, the feeling of body ownership has become a scientiﬁc object of
investigation. One should thus be able to determine the perceptual, motor and cognitive conditions for a body part to be
experienced as one’s own.
Yet, after more than 10 years of studies manipulating the RHI, are we closer to understanding the feeling of ownership? I
would like to stress three difﬁculties. First, the sense of ownership is rated by questionnaires in RHI studies, but it is unclear
whether participants report their feeling of ownership or their judgment of ownership. One may even challenge that they
experience any ownership feelings towards the rubber hand. A second related worry concerns the scale of ownership used
in questionnaires, which often goes from 3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly agree). For instance, in a study with 131 sub-
jects, ownership was rated only at +0.4 in synchronous condition and at 1.2 in asynchronous condition (Longo, Schüür,
Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008). These results are difﬁcult to interpret. Do they reﬂect the vividness of the feeling of
ownership experienced by the participants and/or the feeling of conﬁdence in their judgment of ownership? Furthermore,
although considered as the experimental paradigm to study ownership, the RHI induces only a very weak ownership, so elu-
sive that one may even question whether it induces an illusion of ownership at all. Conversely, in the asynchronous condi-
tion, one may wonder why participants do not strongly disagree that the rubber hand felt like their own hand. Finally, those
results seem to indicate that the sense of ownership is a matter of degree, as if there were no strict boundary between what
one experiences as one’s own and what one does not experience as one’s own.
A third possible impediment to the understanding of ownership is the almost exclusive focus on the RHI. Indeed, it seems
that it is only by confronting the RHI with other cases of embodiment that one could achieve a real understanding of the
grounds of ownership. For instance, one needs to explain how it is possible that it takes less than two minutes to induce
ownership of a rubber hand while it takes months for a hand transplant to be experienced as one’s own, or that one can expe-
rience sensations at the tip of a tool and modify the representation of the boundary of one’s body to include it, and still not
feel ownership towards it. What is at stake here is to understand the relation between ownership and embodiment. Recent
evidence of embodiment of external objects has added complexity to an already quite intricate picture. It is now largely ac-
cepted that the representation of one’s body can stretch to include allograft, prostheses, rubber hands, virtual avatars and
tools (see Table 2). What is included can be in ﬂesh and blood, in rubber, in metal, or even virtual. It may be anatomically
shaped or not. It may be controlled, or internally felt, or both. Despite their differences, the allograft, the prosthesis, the rub-
ber hand, the virtual avatar and the tool are said to be ‘embodied’, though the notion of embodiment is too often left unde-
ﬁned, and its relation to ownership is rarely explicitly spelled out.
The relation between embodiment and ownership has been conceived in at least three different ways. First, ownership
and embodiment are conceived as synonymous. But this view seems to be incompatible with the embodiment of tools with
no associated ownership. Second, ownership and embodiment are conceived in opposition: ownership consists in self-
attribution of the body whereas embodiment consists in self-localization (Lopez, Halje, & Blanke, 2008). But this view uses
a narrow deﬁnition of the notion of embodiment, restricting it to spatial aspects. Third, ownership is conceived as a
subcomponent of embodiment: the sense of embodiment consists in what it is like to have a body, and includes the sense
of ownership among other experiences (Longo et al., 2008). I am more sympathetic with the latter conception, which uses a
notion of embodiment wide enough to capture the peculiar relation to the body of all the various described cases, from
allograft to tool. However, one should not confuse embodiment and the sense of embodiment. Embodiment corresponds
to a speciﬁc type of information processing, whereas the sense of embodiment corresponds to the associated phenomenology,
which includes feelings of body ownership. More particularly, I propose the following deﬁnition of embodiment:
Embodiment: E is embodied if and only if some properties of E are processed in the same way as the properties of one’s body.
In more philosophical terms, embodiment corresponds to a speciﬁc mode of presentation of the property of an object,
which results from a speciﬁc way the property is processed. For instance, the location of the rubber hand can be presented
either like the location of any object in the world (external mode of presentation) or like the location of a part of my body
(embodied mode of presentation). And in the same way that I do not necessarily know that Hesperus refers to the same
planet as Phosphorus, I may not be aware that the rubber hand presented under the external mode refers to the same object as
the rubber hand presented under the embodied mode. Now, an object can be presented under the embodied mode, and
yet not be experienced as one’s own. The notion of embodiment and the notion of the sense of ownership are at different
levels of analysis. The properties of E can be processed in the same way as the properties of my body without E being expe-
rienced as my own body part. This seems to be the case for tool embodiment. But can I have a sense of ownership of E with-
out E being embodied? I can judge that E is mine on the basis of further grounds than embodiment. But I cannot feel that E is
mine without E being embodied. Embodiment is a necessary condition for the feeling of ownership. However, as we shall see,
the notion of embodiment is not homogeneous. The agenda for any theory of ownership is thus twofold. First, one needs to
analyse the notion of embodiment. Second, one needs to contrast embodiments that lead to ownership feelings and those
that do not lead to ownership feelings.Please cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Embodiment, ownership and disownership. Consciousness and Cognition (2010),
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.004
Table 3
Measures of embodiment.
Spatial If E is taken into account by the representation of the body space, by replacing a missing
body part, by adding a body part, or by stretching an existing body part,
If one is able to localize bodily sensations in E,
If the location of E within the external frame is processed in the same way as the location of
a part of one’s body,
If the space surrounding E is processed as peripersonal space, Then E is embodied
Motor If one feels that E directly obeys one’s will,
If one feels that a part of one’s body is moving when E is moving,
If E is taken into account as an effector by the motor system in action planning,
Affective If E is protected from hazardous situations,
If one reacts in the same way when E is threatened or hurt and when a part of one’s body
is threatened or hurt,
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The deﬁnition of embodiment in terms of the types of processing that characterize the representation of one’s body does
not inform us about the speciﬁc way the properties of one’s body are processed. One possible strategy to address this ques-
tion is to analyse the various attempts to operationalize the notion of embodiment in clinical and experimental studies.
Unfortunately, most studies on amputees merely rate the patients’ degree of satisfaction with the graft or the prosthesis
or the frequency of use of the prosthesis. The only objective measure comes from brain imaging studies that show brain plas-
ticity, especially of the primary somatosensory and motor areas, which integrate the graft/prosthesis in the neural represen-
tation of the body (Giraux, Sirigu, Schneider, & Dubernard, 2001; Lotze et al., 1999; Maruishi et al., 2004). More interesting
are the studies with the RHI, with tools and with virtual reality, which have proposed several implicit measures of embodiment
that can be grouped into three categories: spatial measures, motor measures and affective measures (see Table 3).
3.1. Spatial measures of embodiment
The spatial measures are the most preponderant in the literature. The embodied object E can be considered within three
different spatial frames of reference: the bodily frame, the external frame and the peripersonal frame.
The bodily frame is the frame of the body space, as deﬁned by its boundaries and by its internal segmentation into body
parts. Body geometry (i.e. the size of body parts) is especially important when acting. To reach successfully for an object, one
needs to know the length of one’s arm. If E is taken into account by the representation of the body space, by replacing a miss-
ing body part, by adding a new body part, or by stretching an existing body part, then E can be said to be embodied. For
instance, it was shown that prosthesis users overestimated the length of their residual limb as the result of prosthesis
use (McDonnell, Scott, Dickison, Theriault, & Wood, 1989). Similarly, a recent study by Cardinali, Frassinetti and coll.
(2009) showed an increase of the represented length of the arm after tool use. As Butler (1872, p. 267) noted in Erewhon
more than a century ago, ‘‘Observe a man digging with a spade; his right fore-arm has become artiﬁcially lengthened,
and his hand has become a joint”.
Furthermore, the representation of the body space is also the representation of the space where one can feel bodily sen-
sations. Hence, to be able to localize bodily sensations in E shows that E is taken into account by the representation of the
body space and that E is embodied. And indeed this has been found with tools (e.g., Yamamoto, Moizumi, & Kitazawa, 2005),
rubber hands (e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Durgin, Evans, Dunphy, Klostermann, & Simmons, 2007), virtual hands
(Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996), and prostheses (Murray, 2004). As reported by an amputee, ‘‘I can actually
‘feel’ some things that come into contact with the prosthesis, without having to see them” (in Murray, 2004, p. 970).
The external frame is the frame of the external world within which one navigates. If the location of E within the external
frame is processed in the same way as the location of a part of one’s body, then E is embodied. For instance, after a few min-
utes of remote control of a robot arm through a virtual reality apparatus, one participant was afraid to drop the object held
by the robot hand for fear that it might fall on his foot, as if his own foot were below the robot arm (Cole, Sacks, & Waterman,
2000). This spatial response of embodiment is reﬂected by proprioceptive drift (i.e. mislocalization of one’s touched hand or
one’s body towards the rubber hand or the virtual body) in the RHI and in full-body illusions (e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998;
Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007). The proprioceptive drift in the RHI, however, was found only when partic-
ipants gave perceptual responses, but not when they gave motor responses (e.g. moving one’s touched hand or reaching for it
with the contralateral hand, cf. Kammers, de Vignemont, Verhagen, & Dijkerman, 2009).
The peripersonal frame is the frame of the space immediately surrounding a speciﬁc part of one’s body (630–50 cm).
When a threatening object enters the spatial margin of safety around their body, animals engage in a range of protective
behaviors (Cooke & Graziano, 2003). The representation of such a narrow sector of space is grounded on the activity of
multisensory neurons whose activity decreases as the distance between visual stimuli and tactile stimuli increases. In humans,
it was found that the location of visual stimuli interfered with tactile performance, but only when the visual distractor was
close to a part of the body (i.e. cross-modal congruency effect, cf. Spence & Walton, 2005). Hence, if the space surroundingPlease cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Embodiment, ownership and disownership. Consciousness and Cognition (2010),
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.004
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increased by tool use (e.g., Cardinali, Brozzoli, & Farnè, 2009; Farnè & Làdavas, 2000; Maravita & Iriki, 2004). In addition,
in RHI and full-body illusion studies, participants showed cross-modal congruency effects: visual stimuli close to the rubber
hand (or the virtual body) affected tactile perception (Aspell, Lenggenhager, & Blanke, 2009; Zopf, Savage, & Williams, 2010).
3.2. Motor measures of embodiment
Motor measures often constitute key measures of embodiment in virtual reality studies and in tool studies. However, they
are less used to evaluate the RHI, and when they are, it is often with little success (Longo et al., 2008; Schütz-Bosbach,
Mancini, Aglioti, & Haggard, 2006). Embodiment has consequences both on action awareness and action planning.
At the subjective level, one feels that one’s body directly obeys one’s will. There is no need to be actually moving to expe-
rience the sense of bodily obedience. The body is experienced as directly available to carry out actions. Although related like
two sides of the same coin, the sense of bodily obedience is distinct from the sense of control. Unlike the sense of control,
which is primarily about movements, the sense of bodily obedience is primarily about the effectors that perform the move-
ments. Hence, if one feels that E directly obeys one’s will, then E is embodied. A further dimension of action awareness is the
experience that one’s body is moving. If one feels that a part of one’s body is moving when E is moving, then E is embodied.
Both the sense of bodily obedience and the sensation of movements can be found in amputees when they see a virtual
arm moving (Cole, Crowle, Austwick, & Slater, 2009; Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996). This is consistent with
the restoration of motor cortex activity in amputees with phantom limbs during observation of virtual hand movements
(Giraux & Sirigu, 2003). Similarly, it was found that hemiplegic patients with anosognosia vividly felt having generated a
movement of their paralyzed arm after seeing a prosthetic arm moving (Fotopoulou et al., 2008, p. 3438): ‘‘Sometimes I
had the impression that even if I had closed my eyes I would feel it move. I mean I felt the movement in my hand. I didn’t
just see it”. Finally, healthy individuals can feel that they control the movements of a virtual hand if they match their own
bodily movements (Short &Ward, 2009) or their motor imagery (Perez-Marcos, Slater, & Sanchez-Vives, 2009), no matter the
visual resemblance and the spatial proximity between the real hand and the virtual hand.2
At the level of motor planning, the motor system must take into account the properties of the effector such as its size, its
strength, its location, its posture, etc. Hence, if the motor system takes the properties of E into account as properties of the
effector in action planning, then E is embodied. For instance, Cardinali, Frassinetti and coll. (2009) showed that using a long
mechanical tool to grasp objects altered the kinematics of subsequent free-hand grasping movements and of other non-
trained movements like pointing.
The motor responses are more contrasted in RHI studies than in tool studies. On the one hand, participants report feeling
no control over the rubber hand (Longo et al., 2008). Furthermore, the location of the rubber hand is not taken into account
by the motor system (Kammers, de Vignemont et al., 2009). On the other hand a further study showed that the size of the
grip aperture of the rubber hand affected subsequent grasping movements (Kammers, Kootker, Hogendoorn, & Dijkerman,
2010). Finally, there is some debate whether one can induce motor facilitation effect in RHI studies. Motor imagery and ac-
tion observation induce corresponding motor activity in subjects (i.e. motor facilitation effect). In line with these results, it
was found an increased tendency of muscular activity when participants saw a virtual arm slowly rotating after synchronous
stimulation of the biological arm and the virtual arm (Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008). However, in
Schütz-Bosbach and coll. (2006), the reverse effect was found: the observation of the rubber hand in movement induced
a motor facilitation effect only after asynchronous stimulation. It is unclear, however, whether motor facilitation effect
should be accepted as a measure of embodiment.
3.3. Affective measures of embodiment
The affective measures evaluate behavioral and physiological responses when the body is put in dangerous situations that
can potentially harm it. By self-preservation, one avoids such situations as much as one can (e.g., one does not use one’s hand
to stoke a campﬁre or to stir a pot of boiling soup) and one reacts vividly when it happens, showing an increase of heart
rhythm and of skin conductance reaction (SCR), as well as brain activity of the pain network. Hence, if E is protected from
hazardous situations and one reacts to threats to or injuries of E in the same way as one reacts when a part of one’s body is
threatened or hurt, then E is embodied. One can immediately see that the embodiment of tools fails to meet the affective
criteria (Povinelli, Reaux, & Frey, 2010). Roughly speaking, one uses spoons to stir the pot of boiling soup. By contrast, when
participants see the rubber hand being hit by a hammer or penetrated by a needle, they show a strong SCR (Ehrsson, Wiech,
Weiskopf, Dolan, & Passingham, 2007). Similarly, when participants see their virtual avatar in a stressful virtual height
situation, they show an affective reaction similar to the one that occurs when one experiences vertigo (Meehan, Razzaque,
Insko, Whitton, & Brooks, 2005).
To conclude, there is a wide variety of measures of embodiment based on what is known about the speciﬁc ways one
represents the space of one’s body and one’s body in space, one experiences one’s body in relation to action and one reacts
to harmful situations for one’s body. The problem, however, is that the responses are not always correlated. That does not2 It is worth noting that in all the studies, subjects always had the intention to perform the movement they saw performed by the prosthetic or virtual hand.
One may wonder what would happen if they did not intend to move. Would they still feel that they are moving?
Please cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Embodiment, ownership and disownership. Consciousness and Cognition (2010),
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Table 4
Differences between rubber hand embodiment and tool embodiment.
Rubber hand embodiment Tool embodiment
Mechanism Passive process of visual capture of touch Active process of motor learning
Spatiality Incorporation Extension
Anatomical shape Yes No
Affective response for harmful situations Yes No
Sense of bodily obedience No Yes
Sense of body ownership Yes No
6 F. de Vignemont / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2010) xxx–xxxshow that the object is not embodied. Those responses are indeed sufﬁcient conditions for embodiment, but not necessary
conditions. But the lack of correlation questions the homogeneity of the notion of embodiment.
4. The manifold of embodiment
There are many differences between the artiﬁcial embodiment of allograft, prostheses, rubber hands, virtual avatars and
tools, and at various levels. To start with, some artiﬁcial embodiments occur in amputees with missing limbs (e.g., graft,
prosthesis), while others occur in healthy individualswith a fully functioning body (e.g., RHI; virtual avatar).What is embodied
can be the whole body (e.g., virtual avatar, full-body illusion) or merely a body part (e.g., rubber hand, prosthesis, graft). And
whereas inmost situations theexternalobjectshave tobebodily shaped tobeembodied, thoughnotnecessarilyvisually resem-
bling the subject’s biological limb, this is not true for tools. As for the dynamics, embodiment may take from no more than a
couple of minutes (e.g., RHI) to a couple of months (e.g., graft). This huge variability goes along with differences at the level
of the associated phenomenology. It starts from ‘‘I feel that it is an extension of my body” to ‘‘I feel that it is part of my body”,
from ‘‘I feel that it ismine” to ‘‘I feel that it isme”.Althougha recent study showedsimilar enhancementofvisual detectionwhen
visual stimuli were projected on a rubber hand and on a gardening tool after training (Kao & Goodale, 2009), one of the most
important contrasts may be between the embodiment of rubber hands in RHI and the embodiment of tools after tool use
(see Table 4) (formore detail, see de Vignemont & Farnè, 2010). Themost striking differencemay be the lack of ownership feel-
ing for tools. As Botvinick (2004, p. 783) noted, ‘‘the feeling of ownership thatwe have for our bodies clearly does not extend to,
for example, the fork we use at dinner”. In the face of these differences, the alternative is the following. Either one claims that
tools are not really embodied (Povinelli et al., 2010) or one claims that there ismore than one type of embodiment. I shall adopt
the latter solution and propose a taxonomy of the manifold of embodiment to capture the diversity of phenomena at stake.
4.1. A few distinctions
First, we need to contrast embodiment with what I call full embodiment: E is fully embodied if and only if all its properties
are processed in the same way as the properties of one’s body. I suspect that only one’s own biological limbs under normal
circumstances ﬁt this deﬁnition. On the contrary, for being embodied, there is no need for all the properties of E to be taken
into account by the corresponding type of bodily processing. It sufﬁces that some are. And indeed the lack of correlation be-
tween the various measures shows that an object can be embodied for some tasks, but not for others.
One may believe that differences among the various types of embodiment result exclusively from differences between the
mechanisms that induce embodiment. On this view, the differences between rubber hand embodiment and tool embodiment are
the direct consequences of the differences between multimodal sensory integration and action. However, recent versions of
the RHI involve action (e.g. participants actively stroked a toothbrush with their unseen biological hand while seeing the
rubber hand performing the same movement, synchronously or not) (Kammers, Longo, Tsakiris, Dijkerman, & Haggard,
2009; Newport, Pearce, & Preston, 2010; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006). Yet, in the motor version of the RHI, the rubber
hand is not taken into account to a greater extent by the motor system (Newport et al., 2010). The difference with tool
embodiment has not been erased.
Rather than analysing the various types of embodiment in terms of triggering mechanisms, I suggest appealing to their
functional role(s). The key question then is why E is embodied. For what reasons and in what contexts should the brain pro-
cess E in the same way as one’s body? In line with the Perception–Action model of vision, I suggest distinguishing between
perceptual embodiment and motor embodiment. An object is perceptually embodied if it is processed in the same way as a
part of one’s body for perceptual tasks. An object is motorically embodied if it is processed in the same way as a part of one’s
body for motor tasks. The distinction between perceptual and motor embodiment is linked to the speciﬁc type of body rep-
resentations within which E is integrated. Although controversial, it is classically assumed that there are at least two types of
body representations (de Vignemont, 2010; Gallagher, 2005; Paillard, 1999). The body schema is an umbrella term that re-
fers to sensorimotor representations of bodily properties, both when the body is the goal and when it is the means of the
action. Action-oriented body representations are required at several stages in action planning and control. By contrast,
the body image groups all the other representations about the body that are not used for action, whether they are perceptual,
conceptual or emotional. One may then suggest that perceptual embodiment consists in representing the object within the
body image, whereas motor embodiment consists in representing the object within the body schema. Perceptual embodi-
ment and motor embodiment are always associated when it comes to one’s biological body, but not for objects like tools,Please cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Embodiment, ownership and disownership. Consciousness and Cognition (2010),
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(Kammers, de Vignemont et al., 2009).
In addition to functional distinction, one may differentiate distinct types of body representations on the basis of their
respective dynamics (O’Shaughnessy, 1980). Short-term body representations consist in constantly updated on line repre-
sentations of bodily properties, such as posture. Long-term body representations consist in relatively stable representations
of long-term bodily properties such as the spatial organization of the body parts and their respective size. The body image is
often conceived as a long-term body representation (e.g., body structural description, cf. Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005),
whereas it is classically assumed that the body schema is a highly dynamic body representation, built up at time t, stored
in working memory, and erased at time t + 1 by the next one. However, this view is misleading. The functional and the tem-
poral distinctions are orthogonal. On the one hand, the body image is exploited for any perceptual task, including for instance
judgments about short-term bodily properties (e.g., hand location). On the other hand, for any action, one needs to know
long-term bodily properties (e.g., what effectors one has, their size, the degree of freedom of the joints). The size of one’s
limbs can be temporarily altered for the sake of one action, if for instance one uses a tool. However, it is quite costly to com-
pute the size of body parts each time one plans to move. Rather, it seems more likely that one exploits a default long-term
body representation of one’s stable bodily parameters, which is indeﬁnitely reusable. We may think of it in terms of plastic
bands: we can stretch them as much as we want but they always come back to their default size.
Hence, in addition to motor embodiment and perceptual embodiment, one should distinguish between short-term
embodiment (i.e., short-term properties of E processed in the same way as properties of one’s body) and long-term embodi-
ment (i.e., long-term properties of E processed in the same way as properties of one’s body). This distinction might explain
why the location of the rubber hand is perceptually embodied, but not its rubbery texture. The embodiment of the rubber
hand would be only short-term.
On the basis of this rough taxonomy,3 one may start offering an account of the sense of ownership. In particular, I shall dis-
cuss a recent hypothesis, which I shall call the Body model hypothesis, which posits integration within a long-term body rep-
resentation at the core of the sense of ownership (Tsakiris, 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005).
4.2. The body model hypothesis
To account for the fact that one does not feel ownership towards tools, although one does towards rubber hands, it has
been suggested that tools are not ‘incorporated’, that is, are not integrated within the ‘body model’ (de Preester and Tsakiris,
2009). Tools are represented as extrinsic extensions of the body, and not as intrinsic parts of the body. According to the pro-
ponents of the Body model hypothesis, the body model is supposed to determine what can or cannot be experienced as one’s
own. Although the description of the body model is often left incomplete, a minimal requirement seems to be that it repre-
sents a template of the anatomical structure of the human body. For instance, according to the Body model hypothesis, only
objects that are anatomically shaped can be incorporated. I shall focus here on a different constraint, namely the two-hand
constraint: one cannot have more than two hands, and thus one cannot feel ownership towards more than two hands (for
discussion of further constraints, see de Vignemont & Farnè, 2010). It has the immediate consequence that one should not be
able to feel ownership towards rubber hands except if one is amputated of one hand or if one does not feel ownership to-
wards one biological hand. The proponents of the Body model hypothesis thus conclude that the RHI is not only an owner-
ship illusion, but also a disownership illusion. On this view, one would no longer feel ownership towards the hand that has
been stimulated in synchrony with the rubber hand (Tsakiris, 2010).
The fate of the biological hand during the RHI has been experimentally investigated, but with controversial results. In
questionnaires, participants disagree when asked if they felt as if their biological hand had disappeared, but they also dis-
agree when asked if they felt as if they had three hands (Longo et al., 2008). At the physiological and behavioral level, it
was found a decrease in skin temperature of the biological hand following the RHI, as well as a slowing down of tactile pro-
cesses (Folegatti, de Vignemont, Pavani, Rossetti, & Farnè, 2009; Moseley et al., 2008). These results have been interpreted by
Moseley and coll. as evidence that the biological hand is replaced by its artiﬁcial counterpart. However, a similar slowing
down of tactile processes was found following prismatic displacement (Folegatti et al., 2009).4 It should thus be related
to visuo-proprioceptive conﬂict rather than to disownership. Not only is there no evidence of disownership of the biological
hand, but also two recent studies showed the possibility of simultaneously feeling ownership towards multiple rubber hands
(Ehrsson, 2009; Newport et al., 2010). The two-hand constraint seems thus to be invalidated.
I propose an alternative interpretation of the RHI on the model of supernumerary limbs. Some patients experience the
presence of phantom hands or legs, in addition of their own biological hands and legs. Hence, one can feel ownership to-
wards supernumerary limbs at no cost for the ownership of biological limbs. It can be explained in two ways. Either there
are some degrees of liberty relative to the anatomical template of the human body, and at one level, one can represent one’s
body with three or even four hands. Or patients with supernumerary limbs have two distinct body models, one representing
the extra limbs, and the other representing the biological limbs. There is then more than one body model, each respecting the3 The functional and the temporal distinctions do not exhaust the variety of embodiment. For instance, the location of the rubber hand is not motorically
embodied, while its posture is (see Kammers et al., 2009a, 2010). Yet, both tasks seem to depend on short-term motor embodiment.
4 Like the RHI, prismatic displacement involves a cross-modal mismatch between the seen and felt position of the hand. However, unlike the RHI, there is no
fake hand involved, only one’s own hand seen at a different location than where it is felt thanks to prismatic goggles.
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to two hands, two legs, but we can extend to three or even four of each.
To conclude, the results I described do not inﬁrm the Body model hypothesis, but rather invite its proponents to reﬁne
their characterization of the body model and of the constraints that it lays upon ownership. In particular, they need to ex-
plain (i) the difference between tool and rubber hand if both are processed as supplementary body parts and (ii) the reason
why the body model cannot integrate tools, while other types of body representations can. Indeed, it was found that after
tool use, subjects localized touches delivered on the elbow and middle ﬁngertip of their arm as if they were farther apart
(Cardinali, Frassinetti et al., 2009). This result at a perceptual task can be taken as evidence that tools can be integrated
not only within the body schema, but also within the body image. Why not then within the body model?
4.3. Self-speciﬁc embodiment
Instead of appealing to a putative body model, one may exploit a further distinction among the different types of embodi-
ment to study the sense of ownership. Some processes do not make a difference between processing properties of one’s body
or properties of other bodies, like probably visual processing of eye color. They constitute what I call neutral bodily informa-
tion processing, no matter whose body it is. Other processes are self-speciﬁc, that is, they exclusively process the properties
of one’s body, or they process them differently than the properties of other people’s bodies. In other words, these processes
are not shared between self and others. They are the only ones that can ground the feeling of ownership. It is not sufﬁcient
for an object to be processed like a body among others for the object to be experienced as one’s own. It must be processed
like only one’s own body is. Self-speciﬁc processes thus indicate that E is not only a part of a human body, but also a part of
one’s own body, and of no other bodies. The underlying assumption is that what is speciﬁc to the processes and the
experiences of one’s own body – whether it is the speciﬁc way one perceives it, one controls it, and/or one affectively reacts
to what happens to it – indicates which body one experiences as one’s own. One must thus distinguish between neutral
embodiment and self-speciﬁc embodiment. Only self-speciﬁc embodiment is a necessary condition of the feeling of ownership.
And only self-speciﬁc embodiment can make the difference between what is merely embodied, and what is embodied and
experienced as one’s own.
Interestingly, however, it is controversial whether the measures that have been qualiﬁed as implicit measures of owner-
ship are self-speciﬁc. For instance, it is now largely accepted that affective response to pain is shared between self and others.
Strong affective responses and cortical activity of the pain network have indeed been found not only when one’s body is
injured and when one sees a rubber hand’s being injured in synchronous condition, but also when one knows that another
individual is being injured (e.g., Singer et al., 2004). Similarly, it has been suggested that measures of the peripersonal space
could constitute measures of ownership (e.g., Zopf et al., 2010), but cross-modal congruency effects were found after the
mere observation of visual stimuli close to a picture of a hand with no ownership illusion involved (Igarashi, Kimura, Spence,
& Ichihara, 2008). Furthermore, if measures of the peripersonal space were measures of ownership (and not merely of
embodiment), it remains to be explained why one does not feel ownership towards tools though they displace the peripersonal
space.
One may reply that it is not the responses that are self-speciﬁc, but their strength. For instance, it is not as if either one
reacted to threat or not, but to what extent one reacts, and in particular in comparison between synchronous and asynchronous
conditions. On this view, the strength of the response accounts for the intensity of the ownership feeling. Although
interesting, this view faces serious difﬁculties. First, it was found that the more empathetic participants were, the stronger
their affective response (Singer et al., 2004). It thus seems that far from being linked to the self, the strength of the affective
response is correlated with the propensity to care for others. Second, it may happen that one reacts only weakly to one’s
body being injured. If body ownership was decided on the basis of the intensity of the response, then one should not feel
ownership towards one’s body in this case. This conclusion, however, sounds unlikely. The difference between feeling
pain in my body and feeling your pain, so to speak, is not a mere matter of degree (de Vignemont & Jacob, submitted for
publication). More generally, it remains to be empirically shown that all the so-called measures of ownership are really more
intense for one’s body and that the responses are correlated with the sense of ownership. In particular, this seems to be
challenged by dissociations between the proprioceptive drift and the sense of ownership (Holmes, Snijders, & Spence,
2006; Kammers, Verhagen et al., 2009).
But if self-speciﬁcity cannot be always reduced to a mere matter of response intensity, how to account for degrees of
ownership? I suggest that the answer can be found in the literature on multimodal integration, which also comes in degrees.
In particular, Welch and Warren (1980) propose that integration between various sensory inputs requires what they call the
‘assumption of unity’, that is, the assumption that the inputs carry information about the same object. Furthermore, they
claim that the extent of the integration depends on the reliability of the assumption. The more reliable the assumption that
the two sensory inputs are about the same object, the more uniﬁed and integrated the two percepts. Similarly, I propose that
the feeling of ownership is based on the assumption of ownership (i.e. E belongs to one’s own body), and the stronger the reli-
ability of the assumption that E belongs to one’s own body, the greater the feeling of ownership. The reliability of the
assumption of ownership is a function of the number of processes of E that are self-speciﬁc relative to the weighting assigned
to these processes. For instance, it is likely that the reliability of the assumption of ownership for the rubber hand is weaker
than the reliability of the assumption of ownership for the biological hand stimulated in synchrony. If so, the rubber hand
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of bodily properties that are self-speciﬁc. This can be done only by comparing various cases of embodiment together as well
as by analysing similarities and differences between the representation of one’s body and the representation of other
people’s bodies. I shall now explore a different path to investigate the sense of ownership, switching from ownership of fake
body parts to disownership of one’s body parts. What it is like to experience our body as alien is indeed more vivid and
intense than what it is like to experience our body as our own. The study of pathological feelings of disownership can thus
shed light on the phenomenal content of feelings of ownership. And arguably, what is missing in patients experiencing
disownership may constitute the grounds of the feeling of ownership. Yet, very few attempts have been made to link the
two phenomena (e.g. de Vignemont, 2007). It might be partly because there is almost no experimental way to induce disownership
in healthy subjects, and thus to operationalize the notion of disownership (if one rules out the RHI as a real disownership
illusion).5 It might be also because there is some uncertainty about the relation between the lack of ownership feelings and
disownership feelings (Bermudez, in press).
5. Ownership and disownership
Although the sense of body ownership may appear as a given, various pathological conditions reveal the possibility of
feeling disownership towards one’s body (see Table 2). For example, patients suffering from the psychiatric disorder of
depersonalization experience a general alteration of their relation to the self, such that they often feel as if their body did
not belong to them or as if it had disappeared, leading them to compulsively touch their body and pour hot water on it
to reassure themselves of their bodily existence (Sierra, Baker, Medford, & David, 2005). Similarly, following brain lesion
or epileptic seizure, patients with somatoparaphrenia (also sometimes called asomatognosia or alien hand sign) deny own-
ership of one of their limbs and often attribute it to another individual (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). However, it is with Body
integrity identity disorder (BIID) that the sense of disownership leads to the most tragic consequences. Patients with BIID
feel the overwhelming desire to be amputated of one(s) of their perfectly healthy limbs, partly because it feels alien (Brang,
McGeoch, & Ramachandran, 2008; First, 2005). Can one provide a uniﬁed account of these experiences of disembodiment
and disownership? And if so, what are the implications for a theory the sense of ownership?
5.1. The manifold of disembodiment
There are important differences between the various disorders. The etiology varies, from peripheral motor and sensory
deﬁcits to more central deﬁcits, from neuropsychological syndromes to psychiatric conditions. In most cases, the experience
of disembodiment affects a single limb, but it can sometimes affect several body parts (e.g., depersonalisation, BIID), or al-
most the whole body (e.g., deafferentation). More importantly, the experience of disembodiment includes a variety of dis-
tinct feelings:
(i) Feeling of unfamiliarity: Some properties of the body feel abnormal so that patients barely recognize their body. The
awareness of abnormality can result from a mismatch between past and present bodily experiences. It can also
result from a lack of consistency within the overall experience of the body as a whole. For instance, a patient with
somatoparaphrenia compared the temperature of his two hands and said about his ‘alien’ hand: ‘‘Feel, it’s warmer
than mine” (Bisiach, Rusconi, & Vallar, 1991, p. 1030).
(ii) Feeling of unreality: The patients acknowledge the presence of the limb, but they do not experience it as a living body
part. Rather, the limb feels like a dead body part or a fake body part made of chalk or rubber. Their ‘real’ limb, their
living body part, feels absent or missing.
(iii) Feeling of uselessness: The body part is left out as lazy or worthless, like a sack of coal (Feinberg, 2009). This feeling
often reﬂects the actual paralysis of the limb, except in psychiatric conditions.
(iv) Feeling of disownership: The body part feels alien. It does not feel like a part of their body, although the patients can
acknowledge that it is contiguous with the rest of their body. They experience that the body part does not belong
to them.
A last difference among the patients is that in addition to feelings of disownership, some patients are delusional and make
judgments of disownership. One should thus distinguish between three scenarios of disownership.
1. Patients experience their limb as alien, but they still believe that it belongs to them (e.g., depersonalisation,
deafferentation).
2. Patients experience their limb as alien, and they believe that it does not belong to them, and possibly attribute it to some-
one else (e.g. somatoparaphrenia).
3. Patients experience their limb as their own, but despite that, they judge that it does not belong to them (e.g., possibly
BIID, although it is unclear).5 Local anaesthesia can sometimes induce disownership in healthy subjects. But in Paqueron and coll (2003), only 5 out of 36 subjects denied the ownership
of their limb (Paqueron et al. 2003).
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(judgment of disownership) or at both. In (1) and (3), patients do not take their own bodily experiences at face value, because
they are overridden by other factors.
Among the disorders I described, somatoparaphrenia may be the most fascinating because the feeling of disownership is
often accompanied by delusional beliefs, which are ﬁrmly sustained despite incontrovertible and obvious evidence to the
contrary: ‘‘Feinberg: Suppose I told you this was your hand? Mirna: I wouldn’t believe you” (Feinberg, DeLuca, Giacino,
Roane, & Solms, 2005, p. 104). The content of the delusions is of two types. On the one hand, the patients entertain
disownership delusion. They believe that this body part does not belong to them. On the other hand, they entertain confabulatory
delusion. Either they believe that the body part belongs to another individual or they personify it. One cannot account for those
delusions solely in terms of disownership feelings. The abnormal feeling of disownership may account for the speciﬁc content of
the disownership delusion (i.e. this is not my hand), but it cannot account for the feeling of conﬁdence associated with it. And it
seems unlikely that it can account for the content of the confabulation either. Why does the patient attribute the hand to her niece
or to a dead husband?
According to the most inﬂuential theory of delusion, the two-factor model, one should distinguish between the factors
that trigger an initial implausible thought (and thus contribute in explaining the thematic content of a particular delusion)
and the factors that explain the uncritical adoption of an implausible thought as a delusional belief (Langdon & Coltheart,
2000). The two-factor model appeals to sensory, motor and reasoning deﬁcits to account for delusions. However, one should
consider as well the role that affective factors may play in the etiology of somatoparaphrenic delusions. Indeed, patients
rarely feel indifferent towards their ‘alien’ limb, and their affective attitude varies from friendliness to hate (i.e. misoplegia).
Hence, any account of somatoparaphrenia must be threefold. It must explain (i) the feeling of disownership, (ii) the
delusion of disownership, and (iii) the confabulatory delusion. Here I shall limit myself to investigating the feeling of
disownership. In particular, do I feel that this hand does not belong to me because it feels alien and/or because it does
not feel like mine?
5.2. From lack of ownership to disownership
What is the relation between feelings of disownership and feelings of ownership, or the lack of them? There are three
possibilities: (i) the Independent Account theory; (ii) the Uniﬁed Account theory; (iii) The Discovery theory.
Let us ﬁrst consider the Independent Account theory. On this view, feelings of disownership are grounded on some features
of bodily experiences indicating alienation, and those features are unrelated to the absence of feeling of ownership. If this is
true, then one needs two distinct accounts, one of disownership feelings and one of ownership feelings. Cases of bodily alien-
ation would be interesting in themselves, but they would have no relevance for the study of ownership. However, if disow-
nership feelings and ownership feelings were fully independent, they should be able to coexist. There should be individuals
who report that their body feels alien while simultaneously feeling as their own. Instead, there seems to be a systematic neg-
ative correlation between the two types of phenomenology.
Alternatively, one may defend a uniﬁed account of ownership and disownership feelings. According to the Uniﬁed Account
theory, disownership feelings result from the disruption of self-speciﬁc embodiment, which constitutes the necessary
grounds of ownership feelings. On this view, if I do not feel ownership towards a body part that I used to feel as mine, then
I must feel disownership. This prediction seems to go in line with the negative correlation between the two types of
phenomenology I just highlighted. However, it may be too extreme. Arguably, there are situations where one feels nor
ownership nor disownership towards a body part. There may be no distinctive attributive phenomenology, in one direction
or in the other.
Instead, according to the Discovery theory that I defend, disownership feelings do not directly result from the disruption of
self-speciﬁc embodiment, but from the detection of the disruption (or from the awareness of the abnormal absence of feel-
ings of ownership). As said earlier, the phenomenology of ownership is very weak and elusive. Its absence can thus remain
unnoticed. If so, there is no feeling of disownership. One must become aware of the lack of ownership feelings or the disrup-
tion of self-speciﬁc embodiment to experience disownership.
This theory is close to the Discovery theory of anosognosia (Levine, Calvanio, & Rinn, 1991; Ramachandran, 1995).
Patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia are paralyzed, and yet, they deny being paralyzed and claim being able to move,
and even being actually moving. According to Levine and coll. (1991), sensorimotor deﬁcits are not phenomenologically
salient and need to be discovered by perceiving discordant information. One needs to monitor one’s performance to detect
anomalies. In other words, one assumes that one’s body is healthy, unless one is provided with evidence to the contrary. The
default hypothesis is that one’s body is not paralyzed. Similarly, when facing what you take for a mirror, you automatically
assume that you are seeing the reﬂection of your own body. This is your default hypothesis, but if you notice discrepancies
between what you do and what you see, you then realize that it is not your body that you see.
Like in mirror recognition, we have a default hypothesis about the boundaries of our own body, probably encoded in long-
term self-speciﬁc body representations. In other words, we do not compute the reliability of the assumption of ownership of
our ‘default body’ all the time. It is only if we detect discrepancies that we question which body is our own. There may be
anomalies within the processing of a part of our body (e.g., long-term embodiment of the left hand with lack of short-term
embodiment of the left hand). There may be mismatch between information about one body part and information about the
contralateral body part (e.g., the left hand feels different from the right hand). What matters is that we detect the presence ofPlease cite this article in press as: de Vignemont, F. Embodiment, ownership and disownership. Consciousness and Cognition (2010),
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part. Then we may feel disownership towards the body part.6. Conclusion
This paper did no deliver the key to the sense of ownership. Rather, it did the spadework to clarify the conceptual land-
scape of ownership, embodiment and disownership. In particular, I highlighted the conceptual knots that need to be untied
before building up any theory of ownership. I addressed issues such as the functional role and the dynamics of embodiment,
degrees and measures of ownership, shared body representation between self and others, and disownership delusions. I pro-
posed that an object is embodied if and only if some of its properties are processed in the same way as the properties of one’s
body. Furthermore, I argued that the feeling of ownership is grounded in self-speciﬁc embodiment and that its intensity de-
pends on the reliability of the ownership assumption. Finally, I argued in favor of a metacognitive theory of disownership
according to which the lack of ownership does not sufﬁce to induce feelings of disownership.Acknowledgment
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